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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Digital Technology and the Future of Privacy:
Carpenter v. United States
Carpenter v. United States
138 S. Ct. 2006 (2018)
In the modern world, some of our deepest secrets are held by
third parties who store data gathered by our computers, cell
phones, and smart homes. Under previous doctrine as developed
in Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, an individual
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in data voluntarily
exposed to third parties. 1 Justice Sotomayor recently called upon
the Court to reexamine this third-party doctrine because “this
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 2 In Carpenter v. United
States, the Court rejected the third-party doctrine’s application to
historical cell-site location information (CSLI) that can be used to
track an individual’s historical movements for seven days or
more.3
Moreover, it recognized that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements, and it laid the groundwork for future rulings to
protect the privacy of the troves of data collected as a result of
“seismic shifts in digital technology.” 4
In a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the United
States Supreme Court held that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of in the tracking of physical movement captured
CSLI records held by third-party wireless service providers, and
the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of this data. In 2011,
1.
2.
3.
4.

442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979); 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
138 S. Ct. 2006, 2216–17 & n.3 (2018).
Id. at 2217, 2219.

818

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:3

police obtained confessions that implicated Timothy Carpenter in
a series of robberies in Michigan and Ohio. They used these
confessions to apply for a 2703(d) order under the Stored
Communications Act to access Carpenter’s historical CSLI for a
four-month period when the robberies occurred.
The
Government obtained data from Carpenter’s cell phone service
providers that included a historical log showing which cell towers
his phone had connected to in order to make or receive calls. In
total, the Government obtained 12,898 data points regarding
Carpenter’s movements.
Before Carpenter’s trial for robbery and firearms violations,
Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI, arguing that the seizure
of the records violated his Fourth Amendment Rights because it
was not based upon a warrant supported by probable cause, but
rather upon a 2703(d) order which requires a lower standard, akin
to reasonable suspicion. The motion was denied, and the
government’s experts used the data at trial to produce maps that
placed Carpenter’s cell phone near four of the robberies. The
CSLI was key to Carpenter’s conviction. Carpenter appealed to
the Sixth Circuit which affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the government’s
acquisition of CSLI was a Fourth Amendment Search, subject to
a warrant requirement.
The Carpenter decision is the third recent case grappling
with technological developments that allow a heretofore
unimaginable intrusion into privacy. 5 In these decisions, the
Court has acknowledged that applying precedent that based a
reasonable expectations of privacy upon analogies to numbers
dialed from a land line, 6 cigarette packs in pockets, 7 and beepers
in industrial containers8 may be akin to “saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon.”9
5. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (requiring a warrant to search a
cell phone incident to arrest because a “cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house. . . .”); Jones, 565 U.S. at
411–3 (requiring a warrant to monitor a vehicle’s movements through a GPS tracker).
6. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979).
7. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
8. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
9. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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Unfortunately, Carpenter never hit escape velocity to take
us beyond the pull of the third-party doctrine. The Court went out
of its way to explain that the ruling was narrow and did “not
disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question
surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor
do we address other business records that might incidentally
reveal location information.”10 Despite the protests, it did indeed
cabin Smith and Miller by “declin[ing] to extend . . . [them] to
cover these novel circumstances,” namely to “a qualitatively
different category of . . . records” that “when Smith was decided
in 1979, few could have imagined. . . . “11
So, it appears that the third-party doctrine is no longer a
bright-line rule that whatever is voluntarily exposed to a thirdparty has no reasonable expectation of privacy, but rather it has
now become a fact-intensive analysis whenever a search involves
(1) “an entirely different species of business record”12 (2) that is
“not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”13 “Not
truly shared,” the Court explains, is when “in no meaningful sense
does the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements” because the
information is gathered “without any affirmative act on the part
of the user beyond powering up.”14
The Court is (perhaps intentionally) less clear what belongs
within this qualitatively different category of records. Does it
include precise location data collected by a cell phone app such
as Uber, Google Maps, or Tinder? ECG data from an Apple
Watch? Eavesdropping by Siri or Alexa? Cell tower dumps?
Real-time GPS tracking? Future litigants will determine the
contours of the “world of difference between the limited types of
personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the
exhaustive chronicle of . . . information casually collected. . .
today.”15 For now, we only know that the Fourth Amendment

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2006, 2220 (2018).
Id. at 2216–17.
Id. at 2222.
Id. at 2220.
Id.
Id. at 2219.
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protects historical cell phone location data used to track physical
movements for seven days or more.16

SIGNIFICANT CASES IN BRIEF:
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) .
The National Collegiate Athletic Associate challenged the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act which prohibited
additional states from legalizing sports gambling. Federal
prohibition of sports was unconstitutional commandeering
because it prescribed what a state legislature could and could not
do. This state-rights holding has broad implications for sanctuary
cities and state legalization of marijuana.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n., 138 S. Ct 1719 (2018).
A baker challenged Colorado antidiscrimination law when
he and his company were found in violation because he refused
to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious
beliefs. In an extremely narrow ruling, the Court held that how
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission treated the petitioner with
prohibited anti-religious animus. The broader significance of the
case is the extension of the holding in Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc. that a business cannot cite religious reasons to
avoid public accommodations antidiscrimination requirements to
include sexual orientation. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727, 1733
n.* (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400
(1968)).

Janus v. AFSCME,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
Petitioner was a state employee who worked in a unionized
unit in Illinois state government, but who chose not to join the
union. He challenged the requirement that pay an agency fee,
claiming it was compelled speech. The Court overruled Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that the
First Amendment is offended when nonconsenting public sector
16. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2006, 2216–17 & n.3 (2018).
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employees are required to pay agency fees to unions. This
decision undermines public sector unions since they will now
have to provide agency services to nonunion members without
compensation, and it may raise issues under the Takings Clause.

Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
A California statute required licensed pregnancy counseling
centers to disseminate information about how to obtain a statefunded abortion and required unlicensed pregnancy crisis centers
to post disclaimers that their services did not include medical
assistance. The Christian centers sought injunctive relief,
claiming that the requirements constituted compelled speech in
violation of the First Amendment. The Court held that the
requirement unduly burdened the centers’ speech. The decision
has significant implications for existing state statutes requiring
physicians to give patients state-prescribed information before
obtaining an abortion.

South Dakota v. Wayfair,
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
South Dakota challenged the physical presence rule from
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) that held that it
was a violation of the Commerce Clause to tax goods and services
sold to buyers in the state when the seller had no physical
presence in the state. The Court overruled Quill and held that it
did not violate the Commerce Clause to tax goods and services
sold to buyers in the state when the seller had no physical
presence in the state. The ruling has broad implications for sales
over the internet because states can now tax sellers without local
presence.

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
Employees entered an agreement with their employers to
individually arbitrate employment disputes and waive class and
collective proceedings. Employees sued, claiming that the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the National
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Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Court held that individual
arbitration agreements do not violate the NLRA, and agreements
to arbitrate under the Fair Labor Standards Act or the
corresponding state statues are enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act. The decision will encourage employers to seek
broader arbitration agreements from employees.
RAELYNN J. HILLHOUSE, PH.D.

